State of Latin American Corporate Credit Market at August 10 2011

So it appears the market has chosen to enter a liquidity crisis. Will run through the stats quickly:

Latam corporate bond spreads are at their May crisis wides:

Latam Corporate Spreads at 2011-08-10

Treasuries rates are at their lows:

US Treasury Rates at 2011-08-10

This is helping to maintain a steady yield in aggregate Latam Corporate Yields though this “calm” is not reflective of the dislocations occurring in the market as higher yield paper has no hard bids:

Latam Corporate Yields at 2011-08-10

The Latin American Corporate Bond Index is showing down 1.7% from its peak and down 1% month-to-date though I am not sure how much stale marks may play in these figures:

Latam Corporate Bond Index Value at 2011-08-10

According to my S&P 500 model, fair value of the S&P 500 is not 1220-1250, so the market is still in oversold territory by the model, but the unfolding banking crisis occurring in Europe (discussed below) renders statements about fair value extremely suspect:

S&P 500 Index Model at 2011-08-10

The state of the bank CDS market is extremely alarming. 5 year CDS spreads of Societe Generale (France) is bid at 260 – its 3 year high:

Societe Generale 5 Year EUR CDS Spread BID as 2011-08-10

Other banks showing similar type graphs are Unicredito (Italy), Commerzbank (Germany), and Bank of America (US).

To have one megabank in stress is bad enough. To have multiple spread around the world is exceptionally bad. This doesn’t seem to be getting much press – perhaps for fear of causing a bank run, but when one looks at the balance sheets of these banks (European banks are levered 15-20 to 1 and US banks are levered 10 to 1) and the recent equity performance of the banks, one should be worried.

The Fed’s recent announcement of keep rates low for another two years doesn’t address the problem of credit quality and leverage of the balance sheet of these banks.

If these banks start to have funding problems, the market will spiral down again.

To me this argues for very low leverage and moving as high up in the capital structure as possible, though the indications are there for a repeat of 2008.

Latin America is not the problem in all of this – its banks are strong and corporations are performing (more or less), but it should continue to trade in sympathy until capital reallocates.

On the whole, a bad situation….

Um abraço,

Arthur O’Keefe, São Paulo Value

State of Latin American Corporate Credit Market at August 7 2011

While the market decides if it is going to a enter a liquidity crisis, Latam spreads have started to widen in sympathy to the market. Spreads are 35bps wider month-to-date.

Latin America Corporate Bond Spreads for bonds in USD:

Latam Corporate Spreads at 2011-08-07

At the current level of 340bps the market is nearing the May 2010 (Greece part 1) liquidity crisis levels.

Treasuries helped make July a stellar month for Latin American Corporate Bonds, but, now that they are choppy, they are not helping as much to maintain a steady yield for the Latam Bond Index. 10 year US Treasuries are 20bps tighter month-to-date at 2.56%

US Treasuries:

US Treasury Rates at 2011-08-07

As a result Latam Corporate Bond Yields are roughly 10 bps wider from month end to yield about 6.00%:

Latam Corporate Yields at 2011-08-07

Given the duration of Latam bonds, this has driven the bond index down about 90bps month-to-date:

Latam Corporate Bond Index Value at 2011-08-07

Will see where this finds a bottom, but generally sell-offs in Latam Corporate Bonds, considering the growth characteristics and fiscal condition of the region, presents an attractive investment opportunity.

Another sign that things may improve for the asset space is that 26 week (6 month) correlation of spread returns (lately negative) to the returns of the S&P 500 (very negative) is approaching a high:

Rolling 26 Week Correlations between Latam Spread Returns and S&P 500 Returns at 2011-08-07

Given that the primary concerns are growth (and secondary concerns are the futures of various developed markets) we may see equities continue to lag while credit spreads may hold or rally given their elevated levels.

A variant scenario is that current fair value of the S&P is 1180-1315 with best guess of value at 1260, so with the S&P at 1200 we may see a relief rally which would aid Latam Corporate Bond spreads in tightening driving returns.

Current S&P 500 Model:

S&P 500 Index Model Valuation at 2011-08-07

S&P earnings are still strong and estimates have yet to come down, which is a very different scenario from 2008 when earnings were falling with estimates also being revised down by the time the Lehman led liquidity crisis struck.

On the bear side, a government/sovereign credit crisis is uncharted territory in recent times. I believe this last happened in the 30s.

So much more analysis and monitoring is required. Will keep you posted.

Abraço,

Arthur O’Keefe, São Paulo Value

Equities Index Models are Price to Earnings Models

In these last few months of shifting focus to Latam Credit, I devoted a material amount of time to the transition from the mindset of a single name equity investor to the midset of a macro asset allocator having views on asset classes such as credit spreads, interest rates, and equity indexes (mainly S&P 500 and Bovespa) as well as equity sub-index views (like having a view on cyclicals versus non-cyclicals) to understand where investment is flowing.

Credit investing and rates investing are sensitive to investor relative return perceptions between asset classes. At the end of the day most bonds get paid back, yet there is still volatility in the asst class as funds flow into and out of credit and rates. Why is this?

The results of search for the answer to this why are surprising in that the skill-set and way of thinking at the index level of investing is in many ways different than what is requires for investing at the single-name level.

A quick example is earnings misses/beats. Single name investing many time is about knowing which company is better at its business than its competitors. So at the single name level it could be that a business’s competition is better and customers shifted to a competing product, and so the company lost sales and therefore missed earnings. In this case, though, at the index level sales likely stayed the same, and the earnings merely moved to someone else’s bottom line in the index. Who earned them only changed the the total earned in aggregate didn’t. So the index earnings don’t move in this case, and if index P/E doesn’t move, index price stays the same as well.

Inside the index one will see one company rally and one company sell-off but an index investor won’t feel anything. This concept is captured in the average correlation statistics of the S&P 500 (here shown as of July 28, 2011 from a Goldman Sachs report by David Kostin):

Pairwise and Sector correlation of the S&P 500When pairwise correlation is very low, as it was in the mid 90s and mid 2000′s, the prevailing stories are idiosyncratic – stories about winners and losers within a sector and between sectors (cyclicals versus non cyclicals, etc).

In todays environment, pairwise correlation is actually quite high by historical standards. This can be thought as prices of all companies (to exaggerate a little bit) are rising and falling together.

This is interesting, because in general, as shown below (also from GS/Kostin), index earnings are slow to change (and they are only reported in 4 two month periods per year effectively).

S&P 500 Earnings Graph at 2011-08-03 from Goldman Sachs

Given that index earnings don’t change quickly, one might expect index price volatility to be low and therefore in high pair-wise correlation times, one might expect single name volatility to be low. This is not the case. Index volatility is not explained by earnings beats/misses at the index level.

So what’s going on then? The short answer is Index investing is 10% forecasting index earnings which is more or less easy given that they don’t change much/quickly day-to-day as shown above and 90% forecasting Index Price-to-Earnings ratio, which itself can be broken down into price-to-book and ROE forecasts.

Price to Earnings = Price to Book x Book / Earnings

Return on Equity = Earnings / Book, therefore:

Price to Earnings = Price to Book / ROE

This can be counterintuitive, but the implication is that improvements in ROE should lower Price to Earnings if Price to Book doesn’t change.

So bottom line is that Earnings don’t change much, so forecasting index levels becomes of game of forecasting price to earnings and/or price to book and ROE of the index.

The punchline is that what drives Price-to-Earnings many times are factors outside of the equities markets and many analyst equity models. One extremely important factor to watch and understand is 10 year US Treasury rates. They are extremely correlated with price to earnings of the S&P 500 as noted below (here shown as of August 3, 2011 from a UBS report by Jonathan Golub):

Price to Earnings of the S&P 500 versus 10 Year Treasuries from UBS So today the stories are not about individual winners and losers but about the merits of owning equities as opposed to rates.

There are very deep implications. From 2009, at least, to be a US Treasuries trader is to be an Equities Index Trader. Broadly people taking views on the S&P 500 index level are taking views on US Treasury 10 Year rates because the link between the two is that the same factor that drives 10 Year rates drives price-to-earnings ratios.

So to tie everything together, Index Earnings don’t change quickly. Most of the volatility in the index is explained by changes in Index Price-to-Earnings. So Index models (to forecast the Index Price) are really Index Price-to-Earnings models.

Furthermore, given the very high correlation, any equity index model has to consider the interest rate effect on price to earnings or at least have a reality check on whether the forecasted price-to-earnings level of the model checks witch what is likely in the Interest Rate market (particularly 10 Year Treasuries).

So the bottom line is that as growth expectations have been revised down, 10 year Treasuries have rallied, and this has pressured Price-to-Earnings of the S&P 500.

When will this stop? Probably when growth expectations are all repriced, which should finish in the next week or two. Keep an eye on GDP revisions and 10 Year Treasury interest rate action and you’ll get a sense of when it’s safe to be long equities again or when the 10 Year Treasury is at risk of selling off.

Abraço, Arthur

São Paulo Value